Citations: 25 F.3d 1056; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22784; 1994 WL 170780
Docket: 93-4102
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; May 5, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is included with the citing document or distributed during oral arguments. This change follows a General Order from November 29, 1993, which temporarily suspended the relevant circuit rule until December 31, 1995.
In the case of Edson G. Gardner and Lynda M. Kozlowicz v. multiple state and federal officials, the plaintiffs appealed a district court's dismissal of their complaint after Gardner's arrest on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, arguing that the State of Utah lacked jurisdiction over Gardner, who is an Indian, for crimes committed on the reservation. The court affirmed the dismissal.Kozlowicz is a member of the Ute Indian Tribe, and Gardner is a mixed-blood descendant residing on the reservation. Gardner was arrested by BIA officer Kenneth Blackbird for speeding and subsequently taken into custody after being disruptive. Following his detention at a tribal jail, county officials were asked to take custody of him, leading to charges of four state misdemeanors, for which he was convicted without a hearing to ascertain his Indian status. The plaintiffs' complaint contends the arrest was jurisdictionally invalid and seeks a declaratory judgment and other relief related to Indian jurisdiction and damages. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). A magistrate judge reviewed the case and recommended dismissal on multiple grounds: 1) the Eleventh Amendment prevents actions against the State of Utah, the Utah State Tax Commission, and Van Dam in his official capacity; 2) the complaint does not connect Van Dam in his individual capacity to the claims; 3) there are no allegations linking Duchesne County Attorney Herbert Gillespie to the issues presented; 4) Kozlowicz's claims against the county defendants lack factual support; 5) Gardner, as a mixed-blood Ute, is under state criminal jurisdiction and has no grounds for relief against the county defendants; 6) the county defendants cannot restore Gardner's Indian status; 7) Roosevelt, Utah, is not implicated in the complaint; 8) sovereign immunity protects the United States and officials Lujan and Baker in their official roles; 9) there are no claims filed against Lujan or Baker in their individual capacities; and 10) BIA officers had the authority to arrest Gardner and transfer him to appropriate authorities. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the motions of the state, county, and city defendants, labeling the remaining claims as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which the district court adopted. A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if, even assuming all allegations are true, no set of facts could support relief. The court reviews complaints de novo regarding their sufficiency. Additionally, an in forma pauperis complaint can be dismissed if based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory," with such dismissals reviewed for abuse of discretion. The complaint lacked sufficient facts supporting Kozlowicz's claims. While pro se filings are liberally construed, they must still allege adequate facts for a legal claim. Kozlowicz did not sufficiently establish ownership of the confiscated vehicle. The dismissal of her claims was upheld. The district court's reasons for dismissing Gardner's claims against state defendants and others were largely agreed upon, with the clarification that Van Dam, as Attorney General, does not have Eleventh Amendment immunity for prospective injunctive relief, nor do Babbitt and Baker for nonmonetary claims. Gardner seeks a judgment to contest any decision that deprives him of "Indian jurisdiction," specifically challenging the state court's denial of an evidentiary hearing to establish his Indian status prior to his conviction on state charges. The request for declaratory relief lacks merit since the court determined his Indian status in the appeal, negating future claims of constitutional injury from a lack of hearings. Additionally, Gardner's request for a mandamus order to restore his Indian jurisdiction benefits is deemed a matter for Congress to decide, rather than the defendants. The claims against other county defendants hinge on the assertion that the State of Utah lacks jurisdiction over crimes by Indians committed on reservations. Utah does not have jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian Country but does have jurisdiction over crimes involving non-Indians. The facts acknowledge Gardner's arrest within the reservation and his status as a descendant of a terminated mixed-blood Ute, leading to the question of Utah's criminal jurisdiction over him. According to the termination act (25 U.S.C. 677-677aa), individuals whose federal trust relationship was ended are subject to state law unless the victim is also an Indian. The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that Utah has jurisdiction over terminated mixed-blood Utes for crimes on reservations. Gardner argues that the act did not terminate federal supervision over the descendants of these individuals. The act divided the tribe into mixed-bloods and full-bloods, requiring a roll of members, and it specified that federal trust relationships would end for mixed-bloods upon a proclamation published in 1961. This proclamation indicated that terminated members would no longer be entitled to services based on their Indian status. While Section 677v does not explicitly terminate supervision over descendants, the intent of the act, as inferred from its provisions, suggests that it was intended to apply to them as well. The Act initiated a federal policy in the 1950s aimed at ending federal supervision over Indian tribes, beginning with House Concurrent Resolution 108, which sought to integrate Indigenous peoples into the same legal framework as other U.S. citizens. Congress intended this policy to extend to descendants of Indians alive as of August 27, 1954, not just to those individuals. The Act mandated that, upon publication of final rolls, the tribe would consist solely of full-blood members, with mixed-blood members having limited rights, thus preventing them from joining the tribe under its constitution. Mixed-blood descendants are not recognized as a separate federally recognized tribe. Upon termination of federal supervision, state laws regarding probate and estate management apply to the property of mixed-blood members, raising questions about Congress's intent regarding oversight of their property. The case Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, which involved treaty rights, does not support the plaintiffs' claims, as it does not pertain to Gardner's situation. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Gardner's Indian status could not be abrogated without explicit congressional intent, affirming that Congress clearly intended to terminate federal supervision over all mixed-blood Utes. Additionally, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion that the tribe's lack of consent to state jurisdiction over Gardner's crimes prevents the state from exercising such jurisdiction. Relevant laws allow Utah to assume jurisdiction over crimes involving Indians in Indian country, irrespective of tribal consent, and these laws do not pertain to Gardner's situation.Gardner's claim against BIA officers is based on the assertion that they lacked arrest authority due to not being "cross-deputized." Tribal officers can detain offenders on reservations and transfer them to appropriate authorities, as established in *Duro v. Reina*. The complaint indicates that after recognizing Gardner's status, the BIA officers transported him to county authorities, rendering his claim without merit. Consequently, the motions for a preliminary injunction, Gardner's injunction motion, and the contempt motion are all denied, as is the untimely motion to file an amicus brief. The judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah is affirmed, with the mandate to be issued immediately. This order is not binding precedent except under certain doctrines, and citation is generally disfavored except under specified conditions. The district court treated the document titled "To Amend Petition, Affidavit, and Complaint" as the plaintiffs' complaint, which has not been contested. The court acknowledges a substitution of parties as informed by federal defendants’ counsel. Gardner is the only plaintiff allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The court refrains from addressing Kozlowicz's arguments regarding the reservation boundaries, as they do not impact the resolution of her claims, noting that the issue was recently settled in *Hagen v. Utah*. The Utah Supreme Court determined that Roosevelt is outside the reservation, while Fort Duchesne is considered "Indian country." The precise location of Gardner's arrest is unclear, but the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true for the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, with no dispute that the arrest occurred on the reservation. Lastly, the plaintiffs did not comply with the procedural requirements outlined in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.